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Abstract. Risk assessment is one of the prerequisites for understanding its causes and possible consequences. 
We base our risk assessment on the principles described in the European standard EN 31000 - Risk Management 
Process. This standard comprehensively describes the continuous activities that are necessary in managing risks 
and minimizing their possible adverse effects on the operation of the system under investigation. In this activity, 
it is necessary to first identify the existing risks, then analyze and evaluate the identified risks. In the analysis 
of existing risks, it is possible to use both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods, or combine them. 
We use qualitative methods in cases where we do not have a sufficient amount of input information, these are 
more subjective. Quantitative methods are more accurate, but also more demanding on input information and 
time. The choice of a suitable analytical method is a basic prerequisite for knowledge of risks and their evaluation. 
The values of individual risks obtained in this way are the basis for determining the measures that are necessary 
to minimize them, i.e., to adjust them to an acceptable level. The draft measures are always based on the value of 
the individual components used to calculate the risk number, as well as on the value of the asset , which needs 
to be protected. Appropriately chosen analytical methods are one of the basic prerequisites for the consistent 
application of the principles of risk management, as a continuous process aimed at increasing the overall security 
of the system under study. In the article, the author describes the procedures used in risk assessment, as well 
as specific analytical methods that can be used in working with risks. The aim of identifying risk factors is to 
create a list of events that could cause undesirable disruption to ongoing processes. At this stage, we define all 
the risks that will be subsequently analyzed and evaluated. When identifying, we can use methods such as, e.g. 
SWOT, PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) or CA (Checklist Analysis). Methods suitable for determining the causes 
and creating scenarios for the course of a risk event are ETA (Event Tree Analysis) or FTA (Fault Tree Analysis). 
The basic analysis of the system can be performed using the FMEA method (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis), 
which provides a numerical risk assessment. By comparison with the numerical value of the risk that we are 
willing to accept, we obtain 2 groups of risks. Acceptable, which will be given regular attention and unacceptable, 
which we will focus on in risk management and we will try to minimize its negative affect on the functioning of 
the system under study.
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Introduction
The security of the systems is constantly increasing 
thanks to the technical improvement of their elements. 
However, this is only one of the prerequisites for their 
safe operation. Another is the constant knowledge and 
research of security risks associated with the possible 
realization of threats to which the system is constantly 
exposed. The degree of development of individual 
threats can lead to the occurrence of extraordinary 
events (hereinafter referred to as MU). Therefore, it is 
necessary to constantly monitor individual safety aspects 
by analyzing and evaluating existing safety risks as 
a function of the probability of the occurrence of adverse 
events and their consequences (Newsome, 2013). 
Every extraordinary event requires a thorough analysis, 
which examines the causes of its occurrence, course, 
consequences and measures and recommendations 
taken. The primary task of the measures is to restore 
the functionality of the system and try to reduce the 
risk to an acceptable level. A necessary prerequisite for 
assessing the security status of the system is therefore 
knowledge of the safe risks expressed by the interaction 
of two parameters, which then determine the focus of 
measures and recommendations in the area of necessary 
prevention or remediation.
The safety of each system and its individual components 
depends to a large extent on the preparedness for 
possible risk situations, the adoption of preventive 
measures, the identification of existing risks, their 
investigation and knowledge, as well as the ability to 
respond to situations, i.e., responses. All these activities 
are subject to Risk Management, i.e., the management of 
emergencies and crisis situations, while the basic premise 
of effective risk management is its analysis, i.e., the source 
of knowledge of the probability of its occurrence and 
possible consequences (Buzalka, 2012).
1. Risk management affecting  
the organization’s activities
Risk management is a logical and systematic method 
of determining the context of activities and processes, 
identifying the risks existing in them, their analysis, 
evaluation, reduction and ongoing monitoring in order to 
minimize losses. Risk management is a culture, processes 
and structures focused on the effective management of 
opportunities and possible undesirable consequences. 
It must be part of every managerial activity, regardless of 
the level of management and risk. By risk management 
structure we mean a set of components that form 
the basis and organizational structure for the design, 
implementation, monitoring, review and continuous 
improvement of risk management throughout the 
organization.
When applying risk management to the activities 
of the organization, it is necessary to respect certain 
principles and sequence of steps:
1. Top management shall support and promote 
the application of risk management principles in the 
context of the organization. Tools can be developed 
risk philosophy, statutory support, financial support, 
theoretical training and training of managers at lower 
levels.
2. The organization shall develop a risk management 
policy that creates the conditions for risk management 
in the organization as a whole and in all its activities. 
The policy should include information on:
– policy objectives and their relevance to the 
organization;
– the links between risk management strategy and 
policy;
– defining the level of acceptable risk in individual areas 
of activity of the organization and procedures for its 
determination;
– delegation of personal responsibility and authority in 
risk management;
– supporting top management and its commitment to 
make the necessary resources available;
-– control mechanisms to monitor and review the 
organisation’s policy implementation activities;
– all managers and employees of the organization must 
be acquainted with the policy developed in this way.
3. Risk management at the level of the organization 
must be in line with its strategy, it must be implemented 
in all its activities.
4. The creation of an effective system of monitoring 
and assessment of risk management processes is also 
a prerequisite for successful risk management, as risks 
themselves are not a static quantity.
The effectiveness of the risk management process 
itself is therefore conditioned by factors such as 
its incorporation into all existing structures of 
the organization, setting rules for its application, 
responsibility and motivation of employees, monitoring 
effectiveness, but also the necessary financial resources 
in its implementation and implementation of measures 
necessary to improve the functioning of the system 
from a risk management perspective.
 
1.1 Procedures used to assess existing risks
Risk assessment is a complex activity in which we 
determine the areas that will be subject to assessment, 
determine their priorities, identify security risks that 
operate in the system, analyze their possible impacts, 
determine the level of acceptability of individual risks 
and then based on their evaluation we will find out 
accept a certain part of the risks or take measures to 
reduce them. When assessing risks, environmental 
security is directly linked to value criteria, which 
raises the need for an economic analysis that takes 
into account the possible consequences and impacts 
on protected assets, the likelihood of their occurrence 
and the costs associated with security measures, risk 
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measures. Risk management is therefore very closely 
related to the availability of resources that are needed in 
the implementation of the proposed security measures.
The risk assessment process itself consists of several 
phases:
Determining the context within the system under 
assessment: from a strategic point of view, the strategic 
objectives, the means to achieve them will be included. 
From the organizational point of view, we examine 
the connections between the individual components 
of the organizational structure, i.e., internal links, 
processes, activities through which goals are achieved. 
Subsequently, it is necessary to identify the areas that 
will be subject to risk management assessment, i.e., 
areas with a higher level of security risks and possible 
measures that should reduce them. In our assessment, 
we always take into account, on the one hand, the costs 
and their effective expenditure in terms of the expected 
benefits and effects, as well as the resources and activities 
that need to be maintained.
Risk identification: the process by which all risks need 
to be identified, whether they are controllable by the 
organization or not. The basis for defining risk factors is 
the knowledge of employees who are familiar with the 
evaluated processes. With a higher degree of uncertainty, 
it is necessary to look for analogies in similar processes. 
Gradually, all possible external and internal sources of 
risks that may affect the operation of the organization 
are assessed. The output is a list of events that could 
disrupt existing processes and will be subject to further 
analysis.
Risk analysis: The basic prerequisite for effective risk 
management is its knowledge. The core of research 
into security risks is their analysis. It is the process of 
assessing the causes and sources of risks, their positive 
and negative impacts, the severity of possible impacts 
and then determining the likelihood that these impacts 
may occur. The result of the analysis should be the 
following characteristics of the examined risks:
– the likelihood of their occurrence in a specific time, 
space and conditions of the investigation;
– economic characteristics quantifying the present 
value of the objects and the possible change in their 
value after disruption or destruction;
– exposure to negative risk manifestations;
– restore the system to its original state;
– possible permanent change of the system;
– influencing the connections between the objects of 
the examined system and the system with its 
surroundings (Hofreiter, 2004).
Risk evaluation: a complex process in which we 
determine the amount of risk in terms of the extent of 
damage and loss that a given crisis phenomenon can 
cause and the probability that such a phenomenon 
Figure 1. Risk management process following EN 31000
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will occur, we compare the degree of risk with existing 
standards, acceptable limits or other predetermined 
criteria. We determine the significance of individual 
risk factors, either through expert estimates or 
sensitivity analysis. Expert assessment is a basic tool for 
determining the overall risk in terms of the probability 
of occurrence of its factors and the intensity of its 
negative impact, i.e., consequences. Sensitivity analysis 
is also a tool for determining the significance of risk 
factors. This explicitly shows the degree of influence 
of risk factors on the activity and safety of the entity 
(Hopkin, 2013). The basic goal of risk assessment is to 
determine a certain value (risk level) for each specific 
risk of the endangered system. Based on the degree 
of risk, we determine the order of risks in terms of 
their significance, while also taking into account the 
influence of the probability of occurrence and possible 
consequences. We then compare the individual risks 
with the level of acceptability and decide which risks we 
will address further.
Risk treatment and reduction: is a diverse process, 
which depends on the nature of the risk itself, the degree 
of probability of a crisis phenomenon that may cause 
the risk and the expected negative consequences. Thus, 
risk reduction can be achieved, for example, through 
crisis policy, risk diversification (insurance), but also by 
creating reserves or optimizing processes. When taking 
measures to reduce risk, we always take into account 
their economic side. The amount of costs incurred 
should be proportionate to the possible consequences 
and importance of the interest protected. With high 
prevention costs, it is also possible to accept a risk with 
high negative impacts, but with a low probability of 
occurrence. Risk reduction measures can be aimed at 
preventing the occurrence of risky events-preventive 
nature, at managing the course of the risk phenomenon, 
at mitigating negative consequences and recovery, but 
also at increasing the level of acceptability of existing 
unacceptable risks.
Familiarization of the persons concerned with the 
residual risks: instruction of competent staff about the 
risk factors that exist in the individual processes and 
activities.
Ongoing monitoring of the level of risks and the 
implementation and effectiveness of the measures in 
place. In this process, the existence of feedback and the 
continuous incorporation of control findings into the 
system is essential (Reitšpís et al., 2004).
2. Analytical methods for the examination  
of security risks
The choice of risk analysis method depends on 
the nature of the system under investigation itself, 
on the availability and complexity of the input 
information – this must be reliable, relevant and must 
carry the required data, from the stage of development 
of the research. The choice of analytical method is 
a primary prerequisite for effective risk assessment. 
When estimating the probability of occurrence of 
risk phenomena, the information can be drawn e.g. 
from historical and statistical data, on the basis of 
which it is possible to approximately extrapolate 
and quantify future developments. If such data are 
not available, it is possible to use a prediction with 
qualitative data, which must then be subjected to 
further analysis using methods such as ETA (Event Tree 
Analysis) or (Fault Tree Analysis). The selection of an 
appropriate analytical method is a complex process in 
which all the above facts must be taken into account 
(Tichý, 2006).
The choice of method itself is also influenced by 
whether an a priori analysis is performed, which is 
based on a phenomenon that has occurred at least 
once in the past, or an a posteriori analysis in which 
the analyst works with phenomena that he only thinks 
could occur. In this case, the risk is estimated on the 
basis of the expected behavior of the phenomena. Risk 
assessment is a process consisting of successive steps, 
in this respect, existing analytical methods can be 
divided into groups, which are described in more 
detail in the following sections of Chapter 2.
2.1 Methods of identifying sources of risk
The aim of identifying risk factors is to create a list 
of events that could cause undesirable disruption to 
ongoing processes. At this stage, we define all the risks 
that will be subsequently analyzed and evaluated. 
When identifying risk factors, we will take into account 
both the effects of external and internal environments, 
which can be evaluated using SWOT analysis. Based 
on it, experts can prepare a general overview of risks 
that could pose a threat to the entity. One of the 
oldest methods for identifying sources of risk is safety 
review – these are routine visual inspections aimed 
at assessing operational activities and personnel, the 
introduction of new technologies in the context of 
existing risks, the level of maintenance work and safety 
inspections. The result is descriptions of possible 
problems and suggestions for their correction. Other 
methods used to identify risks are:
Checklist analysis (CA), which contains a list of 
items used to verify the status of the system. Authors 
with different backgrounds and perspectives on how 
the system works should be involved in creating the 
checklist. The purpose of the checklist is to compare the 
organization with the practice applied in comparable 
organizations. Based on the checklist, analysts 
define issues to identify possible system deficiencies. 
After receiving and evaluating the answers, the next 
procedure is set. To obtain a comprehensive list of risks, 
it is necessary to supplement this method with another 
analytical method.
Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 
5
Vol. 7, No. 3, 2021
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), which is used 
when we lack information. The purpose is to compile 
a list of sources of risk in which dangerous situations 
will be arranged depending on the degree of risk. 
When reducing hazards, it is necessary to focus on the 
situations listed at the beginning of the list. This analysis 
serves as a basis for further analyzes such as WI, ETA, 
FTA or FMEA.
The What-if – WI method is based on the discussion 
of people well acquainted with the research process. 
The analyst is using the question “What happens if ”? 
It seeks to identify events that could be a source of risk. 
The basic precondition for the success of the method 
is the compilation of questions, the answers to which 
should analyze the system to the maximum extent. 
The list of questions and answers points to the 
possibilities of protection against the consequences of 
adverse events and contains proposals for measures to 
reduce the risk. 
2.2 Methods for determining the causes  
and creating scenarios for the course of events
When creating scenarios of the course of a risk event, 
a cause-and-effect diagram is often used – the Ishikawa 
diagram, which represents an indicative analysis. 
Displays the analyzed problem in a simple form based 
on its causes.
Another suitable method of risk modeling is ETA 
(Event Tree Failure): an event tree analysis, which 
models the course of an event using a favorable and 
unfavorable possibility of its further development. 
The result is a branched graph that represents an 
accident scenario, i.e., a set of errors and deficiencies with 
varying degrees of impact on the system under study.
This method makes it possible to quantify the 
investigated event using the probability of its occurrence 
and possible consequence. FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
method: a fault tree analysis, it is a graphical tool for 
deductive identification of causal faults that can initiate 
the occurrence of an undesirable peak event. Based 
on the definition of peak events, potential causes that 
can lead to its occurrence are analyzed and graphically 
represented here (Přibil et al, 2008).
2.3 Methods for basic system analysis
One of the most commonly used methods is FMEA 
(Failure Mode and Effect Analysis): analysis of the 
causes of failures and their consequences, the task of 
which is to select significant risks affecting the system 
under investigation. The first step in creating this analysis 
is to determine the potential risks that are obtained 
from previous risk analyzes (the Ishikawa diagram, 
ETA ...), individual analyzed risks are assigned 
numerical values within this analysis, which are the 
product of the probability of occurrence, detectability 
and severity of consequences. In this way, the resulting 
risk measure (risk number) is calculated, which is 
compared with the determined value of the risk 
acceptability rate. The result of the analysis is a clear 
tabular and graphical representation of both acceptable 
and unacceptable risks. When designing measures 
for individual risks, it is always necessary to take into 
account how the individual components contributed 
to the total amount of the risk number. If there is 
a possibility of a high severity of consequences but a very 
low probability of an event, it may not be necessary to 
take precautionary measures (Smejkal, Rais, 2006).
2.3.1 Analysis of the causes of failures  
and consequences of FMEA 
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis): failure 
analysis is an inductive method that has been developed 
for the analysis of failures in various systems. It is one 
of the basic methods used in semi-quantitative risk 
analysis. Its origins date back to the 1940s, when 
it was formulated under US military regulations 
(MIL-P-1629). In the1960s, NASA applied this method 
as part of the APOLLO program, where it was to 
improve and verify the hardware of the space program. 
At present, it has a wide application, it is an integral 
part of ISO 9000, QS 9000 standards. In Slovakia, 
it was issued in 2006 as a standard STN EN 60812 under 
the name Methods of system reliability analysis (STN 
EN 60812:20006). The application of this method 
itself can be divided into two basic phases:
1. The identification phase, in which experts focus on:
– any potential errors that may occur under both normal 
and extreme operating conditions, regardless of their 
severity and probability of occurrence;
– all possible consequences of errors;
– all possible causes of the error, taking into account 
that one error can have several consequences and one 
consequence can have several causes.
2. Numerical phase in which the risk level in the 
form of a risk number (RPN-Risk Priority Number) 
is calculated. Risk number, i.e., the risk measure 
is calculated as the product of the probability of 
occurrence of the risk (PV), the significance of the 
error-severity of the consequences (VN) and the 
probability of detection (PO).
RPN = PVxVNxPO
In the following text, there will be analyzed security 
risks affecting the functionality of logistics systems. 
The values of individual parameters are chosen using 
numerical scales; we have chosen the numerical 
range 1-5. A value of 1 corresponds to the best evaluation. 
The individual parameters and their evaluation are 
clearly shown in the following table.
In the risk assessment itself, we also have to take into 
account the analysis of past security incidents and the 
analysis of the current situation. 
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Table 1
Value parameters for FMEA analysis 
RLR The resulting level of risk VC
Significance of the error,  
severity of the consequences
0-5 Insignificant risk 1 Small injury, tort, pity
6-12 Acceptable risk 2 Injury – sick leave, more damage
13-50 Moderate risk 3 Transport to hospital, higher damage
51-100 Undesirable risk 4 Permanent consequences, high damage
101-125 Unacceptable risk 5 Death, very high property damage
PO Probability of occurrence PD Probability of detection
1 Random, unlikely 1 Detectability of risk during the offense
2 Rather unlikely 2 Easily detectable
3 Probably-real 3 Detectable risk approx. a week
4 Very likely 4 Hard to detect for more than a week
5 Persistent threat 5 Undetectable 
Source: Own interpretation
Table 2





1 Unsuitability of the means of transport for the given material 3 3 2 18
2 Material storage 3 2 2 12
3 Capacity of means of transport 4 4 3 48
4 Technical level of means of transport 5 4 2 40
5 Security of transported cargo-THEFT 2 3 1 6
6 The possibility of a terrorist attack 2 3 4 24
7 Insufficient level of used IT 4 3 4 48
8 Outdated and poorly maintained infrastructure 2 3 3 18
9 Open information flows in logistics systems 4 5 5 100
10 Using of IT systems with various security 3 3 5 45
11 Outsourcing of transport services 5 3 3 45
12 Service level of equipment used 4 4 4 64
13 Interruption of information flows 4 4 4 64
14 Leakage of hazardous substances 3 3 2 18
15 Traffic accidents 4 3 5 60
Σ     610
Source: Own interpretation
Table 3





1 Breach of secrecy of transported messages 3 3 3 27
2 Unauthorized use of personal data 4 5 3 60
3 Hazards under the influence of an addictive substance 3 4 4 48
4 Organized crime 3 3 3 27
5 The growing volume of cost theft 2 2 2 8
6 Carelessness during transport 3 3 2 18
7 Insufficient knowledge of the technologies used 4 4 5 80
8 Intentional damage to the device 2 2 4 16
9 Open information flows in logistics systems 4 3 4 48
10 Motivation of transport staff 4 4 4 64
11 Outsourcing of transport services 3 4 4 48
12 Participation of civilians 4 3 5 60
13 Infiltration by IT misinformation 5 5 3 75
14 Fastening of material during transport 3 3 2 18
15 Traffic accidents 3 3 4 36
Σ     633
Source: Own interpretation
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The result of the FMEA analysis is a representation 
of either structural or process risks, which will provide 
information on their severity and level of acceptability 
in a clear form.
Risks exceeding the level of acceptance are those with 
an RPN> 30, which are marked in red. The risks thus 
identified will be taken into account in the subsequent 
design of the measures necessary to increase the security 
of the system under investigation.
Conclusion
Using the FMEA method provides the calculated 
RPN values and possibility to compare risks in terms 
of their causes and consequences on the basis of 
a uniform scale. For individual types of risks (structural 
and procedural), it is necessary to determine the level 
of acceptability and compare it with the obtained 
RPN values. As the maximum value of 125 is set, the 
acceptability rate can be set at 1/4 of the whole, which 
represents risks with an RPN> 30. Based on the results, 
it is possible to set priorities for corrective and preventive 
measures, after their implementation to re-assess the 
values of parameters PV, VN and PO. When calculating 
the RPN, it is necessary to pay increased attention to 
the value of the severity of the consequences. The total 
calculated RPN can be low in this case, because the PV 
and PO values can be equal to 1, only the VN value is high. 
This applies to very serious events, the probability of 
which is low. In these cases, it will be necessary to assess 
the possible costs of preventive measures. In the event 
that these costs would be disproportionately high and 
the probability of an event low, the existing situation 
can be accepted (Kuracina-Ferjenčík, 2006).
Risk retention, risk sharing and risk prevention are 
recommended for treatment of risks (Milind, 2018). 
The ability to recognize and manage risks is playing 
an increasingly important role in the functioning of 
any organization. It is a continuous process that is 
a means to effectively identify and assess risks, design 
and implement the necessary measures (Paleček, 
2006). The most important activity in recognizing 
and managing risk is its analysis, which is a basic 
prerequisite for its overall assessment and proposal 
of necessary measures. The output of the overall 
risk assessment may be, if necessary, preventive and 
corrective measures defined for risks whose value 
exceeds an acceptable level. When designing them, we 
always take into account the probability of the event 
and its possible consequences, as well as the value of the 
protected asset. The implementation of these measures 
is often associated with the need to spend certain funds. 
In practice, we often encounter a reluctance to spend 
the necessary resources, because they mean an increase 
in the total cost of running the system. 
Therefore, in order to increase the resistance of the 
system, it is constantly necessary to innovate existing 
ones and add new security elements. The problem is 
the rapid development of information technology and 
cyber threats. When procuring these funds, we take into 
consideration their price and functionality from the 
point of view of system operation, less importance is 
placed on the integration of modern active and passive 
safety elements. When procuring devices with a low level 
of security features, it is then necessary to make changes 
to the security parameters, their configuration, or the 
software itself, which may conflict with the licenses and 
warranties provided by the original suppliers. These 
changes may also have their limits on the technical 
level of the innovated devices. When procuring new 
equipment, it is therefore necessary to take into account 
the supplied safety and the technical level of the 
safety elements that are part of the delivery. This will 
significantly reduce the additional costs incurred during 
their period of operation. However, account must also 
be taken of the fact that the funds thus spent represent 
only a certain percentage of the total value of the asset, 
which will be protected, if necessary, by the measures 
taken (Hubbard, 2009).
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